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Abstract 
This article considers the work of American think tanks in foreign policy-making immediately 
before and during World War II.  It argues that two well established organizations, the Council 
on Foreign Relations and the Institute of Pacific Relations, were particularly influential.  Both 
became involved in government planning for future U.S. policy in East Asia through their 
wartime programs.  They collaborated with official U.S. government planners through 
outsourcing projects, hosted official and unofficial discussion groups and conferences, supported 
networking, and funded policy-relevant research and publications.  The activities of these two 
organizations helped to define the range of policy options planners and politicians considered, 
include the ideas of outside experts into the work of government, and facilitate cooperation 
between the United States and its allies on postwar planning.  The interaction between the U.S. 
government and interwar think tanks had a lasting impact on American-East Asian relations.  
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 On the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the executive director of the Council on 
Foreign Relations (CFR) wrote a letter about private political organizations in the United States.  
In this letter, Walter Mallory challenged the idea that his organization had a special role in 
American political life.  The council, he claimed, was not exceptional.  There were many 
“groups in the United States dealing with or capable of dealing with questions of our foreign 
relations.”  Americans were anxious about the global crisis.  “Every club,” he argued, had such a 
forum and “every church deals with such matters in some form or another.  At every dinner party 
(of intelligent people) the conversation these days turns on foreign policy.”  He estimated that 
there were 20,000 such organizations in the United States at the time.1  Despite Walter Mallory’s 
protestations, the Council on Foreign Relations was in an unusual position.  There indeed may 
have been 20,000 groups interested in foreign relations at the eve of U.S. entrance into World 
War II, but few were significant in the country’s policy-making process.  Two organizations, 
Mallory’s council and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), held a special place in U.S. policy 
planning.  Through their wartime programs both became directly and indirectly involved in 
official postwar planning for the future of East Asia and the U.S. role there. 
 In the early wartime period, a lack of government resources and interest stunted official 
U.S. long-range planning.  The bureaucrats in charge of American foreign policy therefore came 
to rely on information and expertise from outside the U.S. government as they formed their 
views.  Specialist research organizations, later known as “think tanks,” leapt to fill gaps in 
official knowledge.  They provided reports and recommendations that their specific institutional 
viewpoints informed.  The IPR and CFR were established and well-regarded institutions that 
could draw on relevant member expertise.  The IPR benefitted from its regional specialization, 
occupying a position as the largest and most important group focused on the Pacific.  The CFR, 
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an outspoken advocate of American expansionism, gained influence through its elite membership 
and connections.  Think tanks provided significant and accessible information, maintained 
personal networks between members and policymakers, and created space for officials and 
private experts from the business and scholarly communities to discuss ideas.  Their fingerprints 
are apparent on the plans that the United States had in place as it embarked on its postwar 
interventions in East Asia. 
 This article considers the background of these two organizations and their wartime 
programs.  It also describes the needs of the State Department that opened it to possible 
cooperation with non-state organizations.  It examines the methods of involvement the IPR and 
CFR employed in the official planning processes and the ideas each highlighted.  During World 
War II, both organizations were directly involved in planning through collaboration with U.S. 
government agencies and became semi-official spaces for research work and meetings.  The 
groups also supported and influenced planning indirectly through providing unofficial “thinking 
spaces” for the use of officials, sharing resources, and through the social and professional 
relationships between members and officials.  Both organizations had international reach.  They 
linked planning groups in the United States with those in other Allied nations and, as a result, 
contributed to the sharing of information and ideas.  This article highlights the role think tanks 
played in developing American postwar planning for East Asia, focusing particularly on the 
treatment of a defeated Japan.  
 The place of think tanks in policy making is the subject of increasing academic attention, 
rising in tandem with interest in non-state actors in diplomatic history.2   Existing works on the 
Council on Foreign Relations have highlighted the early war period as the “golden age” of the 
council’s influence.3  However, these studies have tended to focus their attention on wartime 
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planning on Europe and the development of the United Nations to the neglect of the part that the 
council played in developing Asia policy.  Yukata Sasaki also has made a comparison of the 
CFR and IPR in an edited volume on World War II.  However, his chapter does not emphasize 
the importance of creating policy networks or consider the wartime programs that were the most 
effective.4  Other scholars also have recognized the Institute of Pacific Relations as significant in 
policy making.  Tomoko Akami’s work, for example, provides a broad picture of the role that 
this international organization played in regional integration from 1919 to 1945.  This article will 
focus on the IPR’s impact on the domestic policy of one member state during World War II.5 
 In 1921, the merger of two very different groups of East Coast internationalists created 
the Council on Foreign Relations.  One was the American Institute of International Affairs, an 
organization of scholars brought together to advise President Woodrow Wilson after World War 
I.  The other was a group of internationally minded and successful businessmen and lawyers who 
met at exclusive dinners to discuss the issues of the day.  Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the 
CFR brought together outside experts and political leaders to discuss with its carefully selected 
elite membership important issues of international affairs and regional developments through 
study groups, dinners, and reports.  During this period, the council also excluded women and in 
practice minorities from membership.  Beginning in 1922, the CFR used Foreign Affairs to reach 
beyond its influential membership to influence the informed public.  The journal took as its 
mission to “guide American public opinion” by becoming the “natural medium of the best 
thought” in the United States and Europe.6  As a result of council activities, its members were 
well informed about current events around the world.  
 As Japan’s foreign policy grew increasingly aggressive following its withdrawal from the 
League of Nations in 1933, the CFR’s members frequently debated the potential impact of this 
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Far Eastern crisis on U.S. interests and the appropriate American response.  The council’s dinner 
series, appealing to a wide section of council membership, drew fire for its contentious choice to 
invite representatives of the Japanese government to address the group in the first half of the 
decade.7  The Foreign Affairs journal, under the editorial guidance of the fiery internationalist 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong, devoted many of its pages to expert analyses of the situation in Asia.  
Notably, an entire issue in 1938 dealt with the war in China.  In addition, the Far East Study 
Group focused the council’s East Asian experts on the breakdown of order in Asia in the face of 
Japanese militarism.  CFR members with an interest in Asia were for the most part businessmen 
with economic interests there, government officials working on the region, and academics who 
specialized in the study of China or Japan.8  At the time war broke out in Europe in 1939, the 
CFR was one of the few groups engaged in informed debate on events in Asia and on American 
interests and policy options in an increasingly unstable world system.  
 Conspiracy theorists have viewed the Council on Foreign Relations with suspicion 
because of its elite membership of influential and wealthy representatives from the East Coast 
establishment.9  Corporate leaders within the council certainly pushed the organization toward 
the promotion of expanded American trade and investment abroad. 10  Such aims fit with the 
organization’s approach to foreign policy.  Within the wider organization, and in sharp contrast 
to public sentiment, members shared a vision of an active United States defending its growing 
interests around the world.  The CFR held this positive internationalist view since its creation, 
which has directed its discussions and publications ever since.  In the introduction to a council-
commissioned history of the organization written in 1996, the president of the CFR explained the 
uniting vision of council members.  “If the Council as a body,” he wrote, “has stood for anything 
these 75 years, it has been for American internationalism based on American interests.”11  While 
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this common starting point by no means led to agreement between members on interpretations of 
specific issues, it did ensure that whatever position council members might take would support 
an increased American role in the world and look to protect American interests globally. 
 The Institute of Pacific Relations was established in Honolulu in 1925 with the mission of 
supporting the creation of a Pacific regional community.  It quickly expanded to include national 
councils representing the major Asian and Pacific countries, including the United States, Soviet 
Union, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia, as well as European nations with 
colonial holdings in East Asia—Britain, France, and the Netherlands.  In the United States and 
across the English-speaking world, the IPR became the major vehicle for collaboration between 
East Asia experts and for initiating and publishing research on the region.  “In the 1930s and 
'40s,” as renowned historian John Fairbank explains, “a great part of the literature available in 
English on contemporary East Asia was produced . . . [under the] inspiration and supervision” of 
the IPR.12  The IPR’s influence on the field of Asia studies and among expert observers and 
government officials was so strong because the discipline was small and the organization had 
little competition.13  As American interaction with Asian countries increased, so did the reliance 
of U.S. government officials on the IPR for information and analysis.  During World War II, they 
had to lean especially hard on the IPR, the only expert group focusing on Pacific affairs, because 
the potential pool of specialists was so shallow and the level of common knowledge so low. 
 The IPR was a more complex type of organization than the CFR.  One can consider it 
both an American think tank and an international non-governmental organization (INGO) 
because it had a multi-level organizational structure.  During the war period, the organization 
consisted of an International Secretariat, located in New York, which sat above a number of 
national councils representing academics, experts, and businessmen with an interest in the 
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Pacific region.  Each of the national councils maintained its own research programs and 
relationship with its home government.  For example, the Far Eastern Committee of Chatham 
House, sister organization of the CFR and during the war closely connected with the Foreign 
Office, served as the British national council of the IPR.14  Although as a whole the IPR operated 
as an INGO, the vast majority of funds and major research initiatives came from American 
members and American philanthropic organizations.  As a result, other member countries viewed 
it as a potential vehicle for projecting U.S. influence or, as former Australian minister to China 
and member Sir Frederic Eggleston put it, “an American Propagandist organisation [sic].”15  
Significantly, Americans dominated the International Secretariat in New York, which set the 
agenda for the IPR.  For these reasons, and because it was mainly the International Secretariat 
and the American Council of the Institute on Pacific Relations (ACIPR) that were involved in 
Washington planning circles, this article will not consider the work of other national councils, 
except as they interacted with the ACIPR and participated in its wartime international meetings.  
It also will use the acronym “IPR” to indicate the International Secretariat and the ACIPR, which 
in the context of wartime policy-planning activities operated as a single American think tank. 
 The IPR moved its headquarters from Hawaii to New York City in 1934.  With the move, 
the organization shifted its focus from economic and cultural affairs to politics and international 
relations.  The developing crisis in East Asia further reinforced this trend.16  Because of the 
international aspect of the organization, which included national councils from warring China 
and Japan, the conflict in Asia impacted the IPR and placed increasing demands on its resources 
even before Pearl Harbor in a way in which domestic or Atlantic-focused organizations did not 
experience.17  In 1938 and 1939, the IPR sponsored a series of conferences on U.S. Far East 
policy and the Sino-Japanese War, inviting academics, businessmen, and influential figures to 
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discuss policy options and strategy.  To address these issues and increase the amount of useful 
information available to the American public and U.S. policymakers, the IPR established a series 
entitled “the Inquiry” that published volumes on domestic and international situations, including 
postwar plans for Japan, throughout the war.18  With the rare resource of area specialists and a 
mission to promote Pacific regionalism, the IPR was well placed to play a significant role in 
U.S.-East Asian relations during World War II. 
 At the start of the Sino-Japanese war in July 1937, both the CFR and IPR were interested 
in affecting U.S. policy-making.  Networking brought these groups into official planning, and 
members were absorbed into the government during the war.  Both groups also developed 
publications that increased the amount of available knowledge on Asia.  In addition, the IPR 
engaged in resource sharing with U.S. government agencies and hosted “semi-official” domestic 
and international conferences that U.S. officials attended.  The CFR’s single most important 
wartime program was the War and Peace Studies (WPS) Project, an unprecedented secret 
collaboration between the organization and the State Department.  It also continued to host study 
groups that became involved in planning.  The Far East Study Group attracted key figures in 
Japanese-American relations, including high-level U.S. government officials and leading experts 
on Asia.  As the situation in Asia deteriorated, the group became a forum for long-range planning 
on Japan and East Asia.  Members, informed by study group debates, were or would become 
actively involved in U.S. interactions with Japan.  The study group provided planners with a 
forum to discuss key questions of American policy in East Asia with other government officials, 
academics, and business leaders.  
 What made the increased wartime activity of these organizations possible was funding 
from the Rockefeller Foundation, a philanthropic organization with the mission of promoting the 
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“well-being of humanity around the world.”19  Paralleling the CFR and the IPR, it was an 
internationalist organization that envisioned a greater American role in global affairs.  The 
foundation supplied both organizations with substantial additional emergency funds to cover the 
cost of increased activities, as well as earmarking funds to support special programs.20  
Crucially, increased Rockefeller Foundation support began well before the United States entered 
World War II.  This gave the IPR and CFR a “head start” in handling the issues that later would 
become important in the Pacific theater of the war.  With the help of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
the think tanks could engage in in-house research and thoughtful planning on issues and 
interests.  Before Pearl Harbor, these were luxuries that cash-strapped U.S. government agencies 
like the State Department could not afford.  
 Despite the growing worldwide interests of the United States, the State Department in the 
1930s was not the vast, well-resourced institution that it later became.  The Great Depression had 
forced hiring freezes and fifty percent salary cuts within the department in the early 1930s.  In 
1937, the year the Sino-Japanese War broke out, the Far East Division of the State Department 
was poorly resourced and understaffed.  Division Chief Stanley K. Hornbeck reported that year 
that his section was unable to do all the work he thought it ought to.  He noted that “a great deal 
of ‘planning’ might to advantage be engaged in” by the division.  However, long-term thinking 
was not possible for his “overworked” staff, which struggled to handle “day-to-day current 
questions which are presented to it and which require immediate attention.”  Without additional 
resources or staff, Hornbeck explained, it would be “almost impossible” for the division to give 
“concentrated thought and careful study to questions of major policy and to the formulating of 
suggestions for possible programs of future action.”21  The outbreak of war in Europe and Asia 
exacerbated the situation, which forced the State Department to focus almost exclusively on 
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immediate issues.  The Far East Division, for example, had a staff of only eleven officers in 
1939.22  For this reason, officials at the State Department were eager to accept the outside 
expertise and resources that the IPR and CFR were able to offer. 
 Expertise on Asia was particularly hard to find in this era both within and outside the 
State Department.  Acknowledging this difficulty, a leading China expert at the CFR wrote that 
while there were many available authorities on European countries, U.S. government and private 
institutions quickly discover “how hard it is to find people who really know what’s what in 
Asia.”  “A natural result of this,” he continued, “is that in our councils and deliberations, in the 
discussion that goes on before policy is determined, the preponderant weight is on Europe.”23  
The specter of war in Europe dominated U.S. foreign policy discussions in the second half of the 
1930s.  Hornbeck, who was also a member of the CFR Far East Study Group, noted in 1940 how 
“it is undoubtedly true that the European war has taken attention away from the Far East.”24  
Even for groups specifically interested in events in Asia, the lack of experts limited discussion.  
In 1944, a CFR Economic and Financial planning group working on postwar Asia suggested that 
debate about the future of China “might be a topic which the Group might discuss further and 
fruitfully even though experts are not available to discuss China’s problem in a detailed way.”25  
In this and similar cases, generalists were left to speculate about the politics of Asian countries in 
the absence of expert analysis. 
 U.S. government policy planners, lacking in background and detailed knowledge of Asia, 
were dependent on the limited number of Asia experts to develop ideas for the future of Asia and 
American interests there.  These experts sometimes used their influence to push personal biases.  
Owen Lattimore was a particularly influential member of the Council on Foreign Relations.  He 
was involved as an Asia expert in each of the CFR projects this article discusses.  Lattimore had 
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spent years in Asia and was one of the few Americans who spoke fluent Chinese in this period.  
He impressed many people as the foremost American Asia expert.  He was also a Sinophile who 
hoped to use his knowledge of China to build American support for the Chinese cause in general 
and for the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) in particular.  Lattimore was 
described by a contemporary as “widely known in this country [the United States] both for his 
scholarship and for his steadfast championship of China’s cause.”26  
 Lattimore’s personal identification with China, however, may have undermined his 
analysis of current events and limited his value, if not his reputation, as an expert.  In lectures, he 
referred to the feelings of “we Chinese” and was known for his unshakable belief in the inherent 
democratic nature of China.27  While he admitted that China was not yet democratic in a political 
sense, Lattimore informed his colleagues that China represented “a democratic type of society.”  
In 1942, he argued at a planning meeting that he was able to assess political developments in 
China from Washington by reading Chinese newspapers.  Despite being uniform, centrally 
disseminated, and limited to topics the government approved, Lattimore stated that Chinese news 
was free, first class, and a reliable source for information on the domestic political situation.  
Lattimore’s connection with China also colored his view of Japan and the Japanese.  He wrote in 
a War and Peace Studies report that while “the Chinese would carry on the fight regardless of 
economic trials and tribulations,” the Japanese were “unusually subject” to mass panic and 
hysteria, making it easy to defeat them.28   Asia specialists like Lattimore were in a position to 
influence the thinking of officials and council members who were often without recourse to 
second opinions on events in East Asia.  
 Because the efforts of the Institute of Pacific Relations focused primarily on Asia, it did 
not struggle with the bias of Euro-centrism or lack of Asia experts as did the U.S. government 
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and the CFR.  The IPR too sought a greater role in official policymaking during World War II.  It 
aimed to establish close liaison with key Allied governments in London, Ottawa, Canberra, and 
Chungking.  The creation of a Washington office, however, was to be the primary driver of IPR 
influence.  The organization hoped that proximity and personal networks would encourage U.S. 
officials to draw on IPR publications to inform their decisions.  Moreover, IPR resources could 
provide official planners with “imaginative thinking about the broad problems of the war and 
post-war period.”29  The IPR also aimed pamphlets and more popular publications at the public, 
“to develop in America a realistic understanding of the Pacific half of the world.”30  As readers 
will discover below, although the U.S. government recruited specialists from the ranks of the 
IPR, the group had more limited and indirect influence on policymaking than did the CFR.  
 The IPR’s interest in Asia did not begin with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War or in 
response to threats to American interests there.  All of its members were interested in Asia, and 
the IPR became an important source of information and expertise for the U.S. government during 
World War II.  The institute fostered its networks with policy planners, hosting conferences that, 
like the CFR study groups, facilitated focused debate.  As an organization with an international, 
not only American, character the IPR also played a crucial role in moving the debate beyond 
domestic forums and highlighting for American planners the different viewpoints and aims of 
other nations.  Especially in the period before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor early in December 
1941, the State Department lacked the resources to carry out extensive work on long-range issues 
in East Asia on its own.  For this reason, the CFR and IPR were able to play a significant role in 
policy planning as a consequence of making their organizations available for government use. 
 The outbreak of war in Europe provided a catalyst for the Council on Foreign Relations 
to move beyond its usual activities in an effort to affect U.S. policy directly.  In September 1939, 
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CFR leaders visited Assistant Secretary of State George Messersmith.  They struck a deal for the 
creation of a secret project to provide the State Department with studies, memoranda, and policy 
recommendations based on the long-term foreign policy interests of the United States as the 
council’s leaders defined them.  The CFR created the War and Peace Studies (WPS) Project to 
“investigate the effects of war upon the interests and policies of the United States, to prepare for 
the Government’s use material bearing on the postwar settlement, and to provide background for 
the transmission to the office of the Secretary of State of such information and reliable opinion as 
may be of use in the formulation of policy.”31  Messersmith wrote that he believed the project 
“could prove extremely helpful” because, although the department would give thought to the 
same problems, “its staff was so preoccupied with current questions requiring immediate action 
on matters of policy, that it did not have the time to devote to long-range considerations.”32  
Through the WPS Project, members of the Council on Foreign Relations became “external 
bureaucrats,” directly involved in discussions and writing draft policy memorandum.33 
 WPS Project working groups created reports and recommendations on specific issues at 
the request of State Department officials and on their own initiative.  The drafters then sent 
copies of these memoranda to the State Department, the vice president, and the president, 
forwarding them as well to other departments and outside individuals at the State Department’s 
discretion.  High-level U.S. officials sent glowing testimonials about the value of this secret 
project to the CFR’s funding body throughout the period.  In 1940, Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull wrote in a letter to CFR President Norman H. Davis that the “excellent memoranda” of the 
WPS Project had been “very useful,” adding that he was “sure that they will be of even greater 
use when the day for reconstruction comes at the end of histilities [sic].”34  Indeed, U.S. 
government departments circulated and commented on the memoranda throughout the war.  In 
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1944, the Japan Branch at the War Department received a document titled “Security Policy Vis-
à-vis Japan” for comment before its return to Eugene Dooman of the State Department’s Far East 
Division.  Dooman wrote of the report that “the paper under examination is the most satisfactory 
discussion of the subject I have seen.”35  Such statements and decisions to circulate drafts outside 
the State Department demonstrate that WPS Project reports on Japan were integrated into U.S. 
government planning. 
 Although State Department officials chose to circulate WPS Project reports externally, 
the CFR kept its goal “limited to helping the State Department do its job well.”36  The council 
made this decision deliberately because senior members agreed that the selection process for 
wider circulation “might be invidious,” especially as the CFR would have to limit the 
distribution to keep the project secret and the reports confidential.37  The CFR rejected requests 
from Leo Pasvolsky, the State Department’s director of the Division of Special Research, and 
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles for the group to distribute its memoranda more widely 
within the U.S. government.  Although the CFR shared reports with other departments, the WPS 
Project continued to work exclusively with the State Department throughout its existence. 
 In 1942, the State Department created a postwar planning project of its own, but 
continued working closely with the Council on Foreign Relations.  The WPS Project had divided 
into working groups, of which the ones on Political, Territorial, and Economic-Financial affairs 
handled East Asian issues.  The new official project mirrored this structure.  Also, the U.S. 
government hired CFR research secretaries to act as liaisons between the corresponding State 
Department and Council on Foreign Relations committees.  The secretary of state’s decision to 
approach official postwar planning by “setting up a parallel organization [to the WPS Project] 
within the State Department itself” was a tribute to the council’s influence in policy-making.38  
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The council prepared outlines for structuring the new State Department groups, although 
Armstrong was careful to point out that the CFR had no “idea of telling the State Department 
how it ought to organize its own work,” but intended merely to facilitate decision-making.39  The 
new Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, which would approve the drafts the State 
Department’s working groups produced, included several top CFR representatives.  Pasvolsky, 
who headed the whole project, was himself a council member.   
 However, cooperation between the council’s WPS Project groups and State Department 
committees was not always easy.  Pasvolsky was ambitious and eager to build up his own team.  
He was therefore at times reluctant to accept CFR help and advice.  Council research secretaries 
that the U.S. government had hired to act as liaisons between the State Department and the WPS 
Project, were “rather miffed” to find they were not always welcome at meetings or privy to 
reports.40  However, because training new experts was a difficult process, the WPS Project 
remained an important source of policy planning long after the creation of a State Department 
committee.  Isaiah Bowman wrote that despite the “Department’s heroic efforts to assemble a 
team of so-called experts and train them in the preparation of memoranda on significant 
questions,” it was not unusual that “Council Memoranda were the only things available in semi-
mature form.”41  The “head start” that the WPS groups provided, and the inclusion of top CFR 
members in the Postwar Programs Committee (PWC), ensured that the council remained 
enmeshed in the official U.S. planning process. 
 The State Department suspended its Advisory Committee in July 1943 and replaced with 
a series of country and area committees that prepared policies for the approval of the new 
Postwar Programs Committee (PWC).  The CFR’s involvement continued even after this change, 
although the organization became less influential as the planning circle widened.  Council 
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member Pasvolsky still headed the PWC and retained key members of the WPS Project, 
including Norman Davis and Isaiah Bowman, who had headed the WPS Project’s Territorial 
Group.  In December 1944, the State Department replaced the Postwar Planning Committee 
again, this time with an interdepartmental committee—the State War Navy Coordinating 
Committee (SWNCC).  It did not include CFR members in this new committee, which was 
composed of department secretaries and under-secretaries, but the new Far East Sub-committee 
did contain council members.  It also received previous reports, with which the CFR had been 
involved, as a starting point for further postwar planning on Japan.  The work of the CFR fed 
directly into the official policies that the SWNCC drafted and the U.S. government adopted as 
official policy after Japan surrendered in 1945. 
 In keeping with the organizational outlook of the Council on Foreign Relations, the WPS 
Project consistently provided the State Department with recommendations for increasing U.S. 
control in East Asia.  This went so far as advocating the expansion of American imperialism to 
replace the crumbling European empires there.  In the early days of planning, uncertainty about 
the postwar situation made it difficult for the WPS Project to develop recommendations for the 
postwar international system.  While members hoped for stability based on some kind of regional 
organization, they doubted the possibility of international cooperation in the Pacific.  They were, 
however, certain of the need for an expanded American role in East Asia.  In 1940, the WPS 
Project’s Territorial Group made a remarkable suggestion for increasing American influence in 
the Pacific.  The group suggested that the U.S. military might provide naval support of British 
interests in the Pacific until Britain was in a position to return with “full power and prestige,” 
even though this could lead the United States into undesirable long-term imperial commitments 
if Britain were not able to resume her role in the region quickly.42  
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 The long-term picture remained unclear after the sudden entrance of the United States 
into World War II.  In 1942, planning for future engagement in the Pacific was difficult because 
council members did not know if the United States would “be forced . . . to carry heavy 
responsibilities in this region virtually alone,” or if it would be able to share responsibilities 
“with other strong and reasonably stable political units.”43  In this uncertain environment, the 
WPS Project presented the option of American control over the region if “complete Asiatic 
freedom [from Western imperialism]” proved impractical, advising that security had to take 
precedence over the aspirations of the Chinese.  A report pointed to the U.S. “good neighbor 
policy” in Latin America as evidence that “overwhelming power need not result in that abuse of 
power characteristic of imperialism.”44  In other words, American imperialism in Asia would not 
be an unsatisfactory course of action.  This suggestion was a radical departure from anti-
imperialist attitudes evident in both official and public sentiment. 
 Rather than an American empire, some members of the WPS Project believed that a new 
balance of power in Asia would be the best option for American interests.  As “Japan will no 
longer be in a position to act as a balance against the Soviet [Union],” this argument went, “it 
will be to America’s interest to strengthen China to the point where that gap will be filled.” 
Isaiah Bowman sounded an unusual note of caution against making such commitments in Asia.  
He noted that although the United States could be “forced to play an active role in Far Eastern 
politics” after the war, that was a serious decision for the American people to make.45  The 
Council on Foreign Relations generally supported an active U.S. foreign policy, but its 
discussion groups had room for a range of options within that framework. 
 After the Cairo Declaration, which followed an Allied conference in late November 1943, 
WPS Project planners began to expect that international cooperation would be a key feature of 
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postwar Asia.  However, even if such cooperation were possible, its members concluded, any 
arrangements would need to recognize “widespread” American interests “throughout the 
Pacific.”  In addition, installations in the Philippines and seized Japanese territories would 
reinforce U.S. military strength.  Members of the WPS Project’s Armaments Group expected that 
the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, China, and Canada would be the great powers in the 
postwar Far East, with no role for Japan.  Despite the involvement of many countries, Britain and 
the United States would dominate as the “chief nuclei” for regional organization with 
responsibility for enforcement in much of Asia.  The Soviet Union and the United States would 
determine security policy for the North Pacific.46  
 Another of the CFR’s programs, the Far East Study Group, provided a forum for officials 
and experts to discuss the future of East Asia, exerting indirect influence on postwar planning for 
Japan.  It ran annual sessions during which members would meet regularly to discuss key issues 
in East Asia.  The study group served both to educate interested council members and provide a 
“thinking space” for specialists.  Because think tank forums were not official, individuals could 
use them as “sounding boards” to test new positions without commitment.47  Members of the Far 
East Study Group included Stanley K. Hornbeck, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and 
leading Asia experts and advisers.  Several members of the study group later were involved in 
the administration of the occupation of Japan.  The State Department appointed Professor George 
Blakeslee, for example, to head its Area Committee on the Far East, which made policy 
recommendations to the PWC and the SWNCC on postwar Japan.  Major General Frank McCoy 
would become the head of the Far East Commission, which advised Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers General Douglas MacArthur during the occupation of Japan. 
 The Far East Study Group’s creation of a shared conceptual framework among influential 
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study group members helped to define U.S. interests and potential actions.  Its actions typified 
how the CFR study groups were useful for “clarifying and giving precision to the thinking of the 
participants on key issues of American foreign policy.”  More importantly, the council hoped 
that the groups would “serve as a medium in which responsible opinion may be formulated and 
transmitted to policy-making officials.”48  In response to Pearl Harbor, the Far East Study Group 
made preparation of policy recommendations a priority.49  Because the CFR records were closed 
for the lifetime of involved members, study group participants had a unique forum for thrashing 
out positions with the aid of other Asia experts and without concern for outside criticism.  
 The CFR regarded Japanese expansionism as a threat to its ideal of increasing U.S. trade 
and investment in East Asia.  The Far East Study Group saw a paradox in the deep economic ties 
the United States had with Japan and its support for China in the Sino-Japanese War.  A 1939 
report advised that continuing trade with Japan also would require abandoning rhetorical support 
for China.  “The present policy of trading with Japan and at the same time morally supporting 
China,” it explained, “makes enemies of both.”  Accepting Japanese expansion with “a policy of 
appeasement” also would act against U.S. interests in the long run because Japanese domination 
in Asia would undermine American business there.50  Influential figures voiced similar concerns 
in CFR forums.  In 1940, Lattimore argued that an “unfriendly or monopolistic nation” in control 
of Southeast Asia —a clear reference to Japan—would damage U.S. interests.  The United States 
was interested in having access to raw materials located there, such as tin and rubber, as well as 
sea and air routes.  Secretary of State Hull pointed out that this also would threaten U.S. allies.  
Japanese expansion could cut Britain off from much needed economic resources.  This would be 
“more damaging to British defense in Europe perhaps than any other step short of a German 
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crossing of the [English] channel.”51  The group thus considered an embargo against Japan to be 
in American interests, even at the cost of losing an important trading partner.  
 CFR members continued to debate the merits of appeasement and embargo.  After a 
series of discussions on the basis of peace between the United States and Japan a month before 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, they agreed to a set of minimum requirements for accommodation 
with Japan.  The United States could resume friendly relations if Japan would agree to two 
conditions—the withdrawal of troops in China to north of the Great Wall and allowing greater 
economic security and opportunities for the United States in China.  In return, study group 
members agreed that the United States could accept Indochina as a Japanese protectorate and 
Japan’s retention of Manchuria.52  The group’s concern for preserving U.S. trade interests 
explain these remarkably generous terms..  Lattimore remained opposed to accommodation with 
Japan.  Hornbeck too was consistent and outspoken in his commitment to the return of 
Manchuria to China.  In his copy of a China Study Group memorandum, Hornbeck double 
underlined in red a passage about the importance of returning Manchuria to China.  He even 
wrote “Hear hear!” in the margin.53  Hornbeck had spoken against accommodation with Japan in 
previous meetings, commenting that the United States would “get nowhere by sympathizing with 
Japan’s needs in the present situation.”54  However, he also had been involved in the diplomatic 
negotiations with Japan throughout the previous summer, making him aware that the United 
States was not willing to make the concessions the study group was considering. 
 Barring accommodation with Japan, the study group considered the necessity of an 
embargo to weaken the Japanese position.  One report from January 1940 explained that “there is 
an increased feeling that we should do something for China, and the most frequently suggested 
way of doing something is to embargo our exports to Japan.”  But the group did not consider 
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seriously other methods of checking Japan’s expansion, including the threat of armed U.S. 
intervention.  Its members thought that the public supported an embargo “not because people 
have much conviction in this particular measure but because they felt something must be 
done.”55  However, the strong and opposing opinions of some members prevented the group 
from reaching a consensus on the issue.  
 William Herod of International General Electric made the case for business opposition to 
embargo.  “I do not believe,” he informed the group, “in the imposition of an embargo as an 
expression of moral indignation.”  Herod argued that the use of embargo as a political tool in any 
situation would be damaging to American business interests.  “If we pursue an ‘in and out’ 
policy in respect to foreign trade,” he explained to his fellow group members, “American foreign 
businesses can have little confidence in the future.”  Moreover, Herod stated that an embargo 
was likely to be costly “in the loss of trade and opportunities” and ineffective as a deterrent to 
Japan.56  Asia expert Nathaniel Peffer took a different view.  He argued that “by refusing to buy 
goods from Japan, the United States would stop helping Japan with the war.”  An embargo, 
Peffer believed, would be an effective means of reducing Japan’s ability to make war in East 
Asia.  He stated that employing an embargo on “cotton and silk alone . . . would do tremendous 
damage.”57  This dispute never reached resolution within the group, and events would overtake 
the question of an accommodation with Japan.  
 The most important question that the Far East Study Group faced during World War II 
was creating a plan for what they called a “new order in the Far East.”  Between 1942 and 1945, 
study group members debated whether a balance of power, regional, or international system 
would best suit American interests in postwar East Asia.  Nicholas Spykman, chair of the 
International Relations Department at Yale University, argued that the United States ought to 
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keep postwar Japan and China balanced as powers.  A weakened Japan, he explained, “would be 
at the mercy of China.”  For this reason, Spykman argued that the United States should make 
adjustments to “allow Japan to be strong enough for self-defense and yet prevent her from over-
running China.”58  In 1944, the CFR added a Chinese-American Study Group to its Far East 
program.  This group made a case similar to Spykman’s, suggesting that the United States 
needed a strong postwar China to check any possibility for a resurgence of Japanese imperialism.  
Postwar security required that China “restrain the Japanese until it is clear that their word can be 
trusted.”59  The Chinese-American Study Group, however, was not concerned with Japan’s 
defense against China.  It argued that because Japanese heavy industry was new and entirely 
military in character, the Allies could destroy it after the war.  
 The majority of group members supported the idea of creating a U.S.-dominated regional 
organization in postwar Asia to ensure security and economic integration.  During discussion of 
the issue in 1942, however, Hornbeck rejected the idea because he believed that the Allies would 
not be able to agree on a regional partner for the organization.  He explained that the regional 
organization plan  
raises the question as to where the center of gravity would be in the Far East.  
Would it be Japan or China?  If the former, the United States would object; if the 
latter, we would approve but either the U.S.S.R. or Great Britain or some of the 
Dominions might object.  
 
Despite Hornbeck’s comments, the Far East Study Group reached agreement at the meeting in 
April 1942 that “as a group,” it believed in “the principle of organized international cooperation 
for the Pacific with the United States as a partner either in a regional or global organization.”60  
Significantly, its consensus on this issue was ahead of its time.  Congress would pass similar 
resolutions a year and a half later, after an extended period of debate and public outreach.  The 
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regional organization idea later gave way to an international organization after the concept of a 
United Nations organization gained saliency in U.S. postwar planning. 
 The Far East Study Group provided its influential members with a “thinking space” for 
reflection and hashing out ideas.  Group meetings identified key issues in U.S.-Japanese relations 
and the postwar order in East Asia and worked to build a consensus on U.S. strategy.  Members 
spent time considering courses of action to curb an aggressive Japan before the war, and various 
international systems to replace the shattered order in postwar East Asia.  Participants discussed 
the value and viability of building a strong regional partner—Japan or China—to work with the 
United States, and the merits of a U.S.-dominated regional organization.  Even when unable to 
reach consensus, the group provided government officials, academics, and business leaders with 
a forum where they were exposed to a range of opinions about key questions of U.S. policy in 
East Asia.  Not only did this indirectly influence on U.S. postwar planning, many participants 
were or would become actively involved in wartime planning for the occupation of Japan. 
 The single greatest contribution of the Institute on Pacific Relations to postwar planning 
was its domestic and international conferences.  Like the CFR study groups, the IPR conferences 
offered officials a venue for informal and unofficial discussion.  What the IPR termed 
“conference diplomacy”—known as “track II diplomacy” or “nongovernmental and unofficial 
forums” in modern political science—offered important benefits to official U.S. policy 
formulation.61   These were semi-official spaces, unofficial gatherings of officials in a private 
capacity.  Here, experts and interested parties inside and outside of government shared more 
openly information, perspectives, and ideas.  The IPR hosted a number of domestic conferences 
during the war through the ACIPR.  These helped circulate ideas between IPR members, opinion 
leaders, and government officials.  The national councils of other countries could submit papers 
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for the Americans to consider.62  It also held two international conferences, both of which 
considered the treatment of postwar Japan and the aims of any future occupation.63  
 Partially because of the value of the conferences as “sounding boards” for national 
policy, as well as the fact that so many IPR members were drawn into government service during 
the war years, the major IPR conferences included many officials acting as observers or 
delegates.  Although these men attended in a private capacity, other attendees considered them as 
representing the perspectives of their home nations because of their closeness to policymaking.64  
Attending officials brought information back to their home governments and drew on discussions 
while developing policy.  The U.S. government’s interdepartmental planning committee 
appointed Robert Fearey, a young officer in the committee, to write a paper on the possibility of 
creating a regency system in postwar Japan “in view of his familiarity with the discussions on 
this subject at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference.”65  IPR conferences brought experts 
together, established valuable personal working relationships, spread ideas, and generated energy 
around policy issues.  This was particularly important because national viewpoints on questions 
related to the future of Japan differed dramatically. 
 To maintain Allied unity, governments were reluctant to discuss divergent postwar plans, 
especially through formal channels.  The treatment of postwar Japan was a potentially explosive 
issue, as highlighting the different national interests of the Allies potentially could undermine the 
war effort.  The IPR played a particularly important role in relaying viewpoints and building 
consensus on the Japan question.  American planners intended that their country would lead 
policy after victory, but there was no set official U.S. line on postwar plans before summer 1945.  
A reluctance to share information on an official level, competing interests between Allies, and 
policy uncertainty meant that the discussions and position papers at the wartime international 
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conferences provided a crucial link between experts and officials from Allied nations.  During 
these debates on postwar East Asia, three nations dominated—the United States, Britain, and 
Australia.  The Soviet Union did not enter the war with Japan until August 1945.  Although the 
Chinese delegation was outspoken at IPR conferences, the weakness of the Nationalist 
government in power there undermined China’s influence.  The Netherlands and France 
maintained stakeholder positions as colonial powers, but German occupation had crippled both.  
Of this group, the Americans held the preponderance of power in directing Allied policy. 
 In February 1945, John Sterndale Bennett, head of the British Foreign Office Far Eastern 
Department, provided a neat summary of Britain’s position on postwar planning generally: 
[O]ur objectives are simple—to recover and revive our territories, to beat the 
Japanese and to build a better world.  I do not see that we need hesitate to 
proclaim the programme [sic] to Americans or despair of cooperating with them 
on the basis of it.66 
  
This view was optimistic.  Americans and other Allied nations were deeply suspicious of British 
imperial interests, and divergent views on Japan were a source of contention.  The possible 
economic rehabilitation of Japan would create a rival for British industry, but a lucrative market 
and trading partner to the United States.67  Britain, in common with Japan, had an empire and a 
monarchy.  It therefore supported a moderate policy of limited reform in postwar Japan relying 
on an “old guard” of westernized prewar liberals and the retention of the Emperor, instead of a 
radical change to the state.68  Suspicion of continued British imperialism, along with concern 
about American willingness to make and keep substantial postwar commitments, were the main 
sources of tension in inter-Allied planning during the early phase of World War II.69 
 Australia also held a distinct position on postwar Japan.  Unlike Britain, or, despite the 
events at Pearl Harbor, the United States, Japanese expansion directly threatened Australian 
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domestic security.  As a result, the country had a significant interest in developing a system of 
international collective security and monitoring Japan to guard against future remilitarization.  
The Australian Council called for soft peace terms on trade and recognition of some of Japan's 
war aims, notably ending European imperialism in the Pacific and even holding out the 
possibility of special access to the Chinese market for Japan.  The Australians advocated a 
combination of containment and conciliation for postwar Japan.70  
 In both Britain and Australia, understanding and adapting to American policy was the 
chief priority for postwar planning on Japan.  While the British did have a clear position on the 
Japan question, it was by no means the country’s most pressing concern.  British officials and 
politicians were willing to compromise and defer to the Americans in return for concessions 
elsewhere.  Despite this flexibility, the British had only very limited access to detailed American 
plans.71  The war revealed the illusion of security membership within the British Empire.  
Britain’s “deplorable tendency . . . to relegate Australia to a subordinate status” and fail to 
consult with them on important issues frustrated the Australians.72  They were therefore anxious 
to understand American plans to contain the Japanese threat and rebuild stability in the region.  
As the Department of External Affairs observer to the Mont Tremblant conference in Canada 
reported, achieving the postwar aims of Australia would “depend largely on the collaboration of 
the United States.”73  However, these allies received only a vague picture of future U.S. policy 
toward East Asia on which their own national security depended.74  
 The Americans too used IPR conferences to gauge the aims of their allies.  In December 
1942, for example, President Roosevelt asked Vice President Henry Wallace, who attended the 
Mont Tremblant conference, if the British had taken a hard line on imperialism there.75  State 
Department planning groups cited and used IPR conference discussions.76  Given the resistance 
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to discussing postwar plans on an official level, and the importance of the issue, the wartime 
conferences of the IPR offered a rare and valuable chance to discuss national approaches to the 
question of Japan.  Thus, the Institute of Pacific Relations influenced the occupation of Japan as 
a consequence of its facilitating planning between Allies.  
 By the start of the first wartime conference, the national council of Japan had ceased 
cooperation.  Since there never had been councils for Italy or Germany, the IPR became an 
organization of Allied member states.  Thus, observers regarded the international conferences as 
“Allied policy forums,” an impression reinforced by the fact that almost half of conference 
attendees were government officials.77  The two 1942 conferences, although they convened at a 
time when defeat of Japan was by no means a foregone conclusion, considered questions about 
the requirements for future peace in East Asia, the role of the United States in the region, and the 
future of Japan and its colonies.  The first conference at Princeton University in August set the 
agenda on Far Eastern postwar planning in preparation for the larger second international 
meeting in December at Mont Tremblant.  Americans who attended the Princeton conference 
included Hornbeck and IPR leaders Edward Carter, William Holland, and William Lockwood.  
Britain’s ambassador in Washington, the renowned scholar George Sansom, New Zealand’s 
minister to the United States, and representatives from Canada and the Netherlands ensured that 
there were international voices at the gathering.  Conference members debated the merits of 
regional and universal security organizations, arms limitation, and control of Japan’s island 
mandates. Attendees also discussed the treatment of Japan and its dependencies.78 
 The Mont Tremblant conference in Canada centered attention on postwar cooperation 
between the Allies and the future of Europe’s colonies.  On the American side, high-level and 
influential officials attended the meeting, notably Leo Pasvolsky, Undersecretary of State Adolf 
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A. Berle, and Lauchlin Currie, Roosevelt’s economic advisor.79  As previously mentioned, the 
president asked about positions Britain assumed at the conference.  In addition, Currie provided 
Roosevelt with a written summary of the event.  The conference reinforced policy networks and 
brought specialist attention to key issues relating to postwar East Asia.  A note from Currie’s 
correspondence reflects this.  “I attended the big IPR conference” at Mont Tremblant, he wrote, 
and “. . . I am still full of all kinds of ideas and enthusiasms for a technical mission to China for 
post-war reconstruction.”80  Delegations from other nations, mindful of the U.S. failure to join 
the League of Nations after World War I, pressed for an American commitment to international 
cooperation.  Referring to Roosevelt’s famous “Four Freedoms” speech, one British delegate 
asked “What meaning is there in the words freedom from fear if the United States goes back to 
isolationism?”  Other delegations, particularly from the United States, China, and Canada, 
questioned the European commitment to the principle of self-determination.  Criticism targeted 
Britain especially, which seemed to be backing away from its agreement to the Atlantic Charter.  
A Chinese editorial noted that “if Britain and America will not keep to the principles which were 
laid down by themselves, there is no doubt that post-war world peace will not be realized.”81  
The point neatly summarized the criticism that dominated the Mont Tremblant conference. 
 Although the treatment of postwar Japan was a side-issue at the 1942 conferences, it may 
have had an important impact in shaping policy.  While the Chinese delegation called for “Allied 
Asiatic troops” to briefly occupy Tokyo, thinking on postwar occupations was not yet developed 
in 1942.82  Attendees did agree that the Allies should disarm defeated Japan, and also strip it of 
territorial acquisitions including Korea, Manchuria, and the mandated islands.  Undersecretary of 
State Sumner Welles shared these ideas and spoke at the IPR luncheon where the organization 
made the conference report public.83  The Welles connection was potentially significant.  In fall 
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1943, even after he resigned under pressure from his official position and assumed a new role as 
ACIPR Washington branch head, Welles remained a close confidant of Roosevelt.  The two 
privately discussed ideas about the Cairo summit.84  The consensus from the IPR conference, of 
which Welles approved, was a likely source for key agreements the Allies made at Cairo. 
 Plans for reconstruction and postwar policy dominated the agenda of the second wartime 
international conference that convened in Hot Springs, Virginia.  Delegates debated issues that 
would determine Japan's future, specifically the treatment of the defeated nation, the status of her 
colonies, reparations and industry, and collective security in the Pacific region.85  As they had in 
1942, conference members agreed that the Allies should disarm Japan and strip it of overseas 
territories and mandates.  State Department officials later cited consensus at this conference 
between American and foreign delegates on the question of U.S. use of Japanese bases in support 
of establishing “permanent [American] control” of the former mandates.86  Fearey also informed 
the interdepartmental planning committee of other positions the participants took at Hot Springs, 
such as treatment of Japanese private property in former territories.87  In keeping with the ideas 
Canadian IPR member E. H. Norman presented in a paper at the conference, the U.S. delegation 
advocated agrarian reform to raise peasant living standards and limiting the influence of Japan’s 
zaibatsu corporate combines.88  During the conference, the delegates agreed that in place of a 
“Draconian” peace, Allied measures to pacify Japan included allowing it international trade and 
educating the Japanese people about democracy.89 
 Connections that participants made at these conferences formed an important part of 
future policymaking in all Allied nations whose representatives were involved in the discussions.  
As one British Commonwealth delegate enthusiastically observed, “the value of international 
conferences of this kind is that in out-of-session discussions a number of persons from various 
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countries who are working in the same field get to know each other, learn from each other and 
are hence better equipped to work with each other in the future.”90  Attendees could present 
representations of current thinking and bring new ideas from other conference participants back 
into the policy circles in which they worked.  They also provided conference materials for 
government use and retention, while delegates had access to official documents from other 
nations that fellow participants brought to the conferences.91  
 Improving the resources available to government officials for establishing a long and 
close engagement with Asia was a major contribution of the Institute of Pacific Relations.  The 
IPR was a leader in directing and publishing research on East Asia in the period.  Government 
officials used the organization’s reports, pamphlets, and books for information on an unfamiliar 
region, and for analysis on Japan and postwar East Asia.  Its publication in 1945 of Albert J. 
Grajdanzev’s Modern Korea provides an instructive example.  The IPR supported the “careful 
research study” on a “country whose very existence [Americans] had almost forgotten” as a 
colony of Japan.  Rather than a “quickly confected tract for the times,” it described the resources 
and political situation of a poorly understood territory that the Allies were about to occupy.92  
Influential figures in policy circles circulated and read these works.  The Council on Foreign 
Relations library requested and collected the publications of the IPR national committees, and 
government officials “extensively” used the New York library of the IPR.  The Office of War 
Information regularly requested IPR publications to inform its work.93  To amplify this effect, 
the IPR circulated special confidential reports on Japan and the Far East to American and foreign 
government officials.  Staff members responded to “all sorts of inquiries” on the Far East.94  In 
addition to carrying out and circulating research, the IPR set up and supported Asian language 
courses to create a supply of Japanese-language speakers to meet postwar demands.95 
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 Human connections between official policymakers and think-tank members were a 
particular strength of both the IPR and CFR during the World War II.  The State Department 
hired WPS Project members to aid in planning, and many U.S. government officials already 
were council members.  The Roosevelt administration also recruited IPR members into official 
advisory positions as the government increased its resources after 1941.  In fact, so many IPR 
members had joined the government to meet war demand that the institute was forced to break 
tradition and invite U.S. officials to its conferences.  In one notable case, this absorption of 
personnel went in the opposite direction.  In September 1943, Sumner Welles became the branch 
head of the ACIPR in Washington.  While undersecretary of state, he had been a favorite of 
Roosevelt and some observers even viewed him as de facto secretary of state during his tenure 
because of this relationship.  In 1943, however, a scandal regarding his sexual activities and 
orientation forced him to resign.96  Still an influential and connected figure, Welles was well 
placed to feed ideas from the IPR into the State Department. 
 Asia experts, as previously noted, were a scarce resource in Western countries in the 
middle of the 20th Century.  Speaking of the wartime period, one famous American scholar 
explained, “we all knew each other in the China field in those days.”97  Area specialists inside 
and outside government became acquaintances because of previous work as colleagues either in 
academia or public research.  For example, IPR secretary William Lockwood had been a favorite 
graduate student of George Blakeslee, who was a council member, a founding member of the 
IPR, and a Far East expert at the State Department.98  Moreover, Blakeslee founded The Journal 
of International Affairs and remained on its editorial board after it merged with the CFR journal 
in 1922.99  State Department officials supported the work of the institute, attending conferences 
and hosting informal gatherings including members.  In 1945, Joseph Grew, former ambassador 
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to Japan and at that time undersecretary of state, organized a cocktail evening and invited IPR 
conference participants.  Grew asked the secretary of state to attend as well, declaring that “the 
Institute of Pacific Relations is an important organization and I think we should support it.”100 
 The high-level council members working on the War and Peace Studies Project were 
generally well connected with government officials.  Norman Davis was an obvious example.  
Davis, who one reporter described as “gray and graceful,”101 had been undersecretary of state 
during the Wilson administration and served as Roosevelt’s “ambassador at large” in the mid-
1930s.  He maintained friendly relations with senior government officials throughout his career.  
Davis was particularly close to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.  They played croquet together 
and Davis regularly visited Hull at work.102  The wives of these men were also friendly and the 
couples planned vacations together.103  Hull and Davis, at the request of Roosevelt, had worked 
together to draft the “Quarantine Speech” that the president delivered in October 1937 in 
response to Japanese militant expansionism igniting the war with China.  Hornbeck was also on 
friendly terms with Davis, and sent him news articles of interest on Asia.104  While the value of 
such links would be difficult to quantify, these networks made official cooperation with the 
council on the WPS Project easier than it might have been otherwise.  The extent of interlinkage 
between the State Department and non-state actors and the fact that many key planning figures 
wore both hats makes it impossible to draw a clear delineation between these groups.  
 The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Council on Foreign Relations exerted direct and 
indirect influence on official postwar planning between 1937 and 1945.  The CFR’s War and 
Peace Studies Project was the most successful wartime program.  Through the project, the State 
Department effectively outsourced its long range planning activities to a small section of council 
members.  As the war progressed, the U.S. government created its own planning structures, but 
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this remained a significant development in American policy-making.  Later official wartime 
planning groups built on the earlier work, so that as a Rockefeller Foundation report declared, 
“practically everything the Council did [with the WPS Project] was meshed closely into the 
interests and activities of the State Department’s Advisory Committee, and the final results were 
a collaboration.”105  After the war, Secretary of State George C. Marshall established a Policy 
Planning Staff that George F. Kennan famously would lead to provide the State Department with 
in-house long range strategic planning like what the WPS Project had offered in 1938. 
 The CFR’s Far East Study Group and IPR conferences influenced postwar ideas through 
providing officials and experts with a “thinking space” for reflection and framing debates. The 
impact of U.S. government outsourcing and cooperation with think tanks continued long after the 
war ended.  Many members of the wartime Far East Study Group later grappled with the key 
questions debated in the council forum while actively involved in the postwar U.S. relationship 
with Japan.  Domestic and international conferences on Pacific relations established networks 
and a body of careful research for the use of planners and later administrators.  This established 
program indirectly influenced postwar planning through honing the ideas of its members.  The 
IPR was influential in creating these plans.  Moreover, it provided knowledge and networks that 
were useful not just in the planning phase, but also during the occupation of Japan, even as the 
institute itself declined.  Think tank collaboration had a significant impact in determining how 
U.S. policy toward East Asia developed both during and immediately after World War II. 
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